Russia’s economy has, so far, coped better with Western sanctions than many analysts expected in the immediate aftermath of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The IMF’s latest projections for Russian GDP in 2026 are little changed from their pre‑war baseline, underlining how far headline activity has been insulated from the shock. One important reason is a rapid reorientation of Russia’s trade towards Asia, as Moscow has found new markets for its energy exports and new suppliers for critical imports with both military and civilian uses.

In this research note, we examines the scale and durability of that pivot, focusing on a basket of “High Priority” goods identified by the UK government as being at particular risk of sanctions circumvention. These include advanced electronic components such as integrated circuits and RF transceiver modules, which are essential for Russia’s defence industry as well as for broader industrial production. By tracking how exports of these items to Russia have evolved since 2019, and how trade routes have shifted away from traditional Western suppliers towards Asian intermediaries, the note sheds light on where sanctions are biting – and where they are leaking.

To quantify this, we developed a Russia Sanctions Leakage Index, a systematic measure of the extent to which targeted goods continue to reach Russia despite formal restrictions. The index aggregates detailed trade data across multiple jurisdictions and product lines, capturing changes in volumes, prices and routing patterns as exporters adjust to the sanctions regime. It provides an evidence‑based way to distinguish between genuine reductions in Russia’s access to sensitive technology and mere diversion of flows via third countries.